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691

I. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT

1. Q. What is AWACS?
2. Q. Why do the Saudis need AWACS?
3. Q. Why not sell the Saudis ground radar instead of AWACS?
4. Q. If the Saudis do not get an aerial refueling tanker, could they use AWACS effectively?
5. Q. How was the decision to sell AWACS made?
6. Q. Is AWACS technology less sensitive now than when it was considered for sale to Iran?

Conformal Fuel Tanks and Aerial Refueling Tankers

7. Q. Why do the Saudis need extra fuel tanks and tankers?
8. Q. Could a Saudi F-15, with conformal fuel tanks bomb Jerusalem?
9. Q. Is it not true that U.S. F-15s have flown nonstop directly from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia utilizing aerial refueling?
10. Q. Could other countries produce conformal fuel tanks?
11. Q. What other countries produce tanker aircraft?

AIM 9-L Missile

12. Q. Why do the Saudis need new 9L Sidewinder missiles?
13. Q. What would be the impact on security if the A9-L fell into Soviet hands?
14. Q. Isn't the AIM 9-L missile significantly better than earlier model AIM 9's in most circumstances? What advantage would this give the Saudis?

MER 200 Bomb Rack

15. Q. Does the Administration intend to sell the MER 200 to Saudi Arabia? Would Congress be consulted?

16. Q. Why would the Saudis want the MER 200 bomb rack?

II. REASONS FOR SELLING THIS EQUIPMENT TO THE SAUDIS

17. Q. What are the new circumstances that justify abandoning the 1978 assurances to Congress on Saudi Arabian F-15s?

18. Q. Can you describe the Soviet threat to Saudi Arabia?

19. Q. Don't the Saudis believe that Israel is a greater threat to them than the Soviet Union? Didn't Oil Minister Yamani recently state this?

20 Q. To what degree do the Saudis see these sales in political terms as a test of will -- as opposed to their military requirements for this equipment?

21. Q. What happens if we don't sell this equipment to Saudi Arabia?

22. Q. Aren't we meeting the Saudi request primarily because they have us over the oil barrel?

23. Q. What "quid" will we receive from the Saudis? Don't they benefit more from our bilateral relationship than the US?

24. Q. Why not simply continue the current deployment of US AWACS instead of selling this aircraft to the Saudis?

III. THREAT TO ISRAEL AND REGIONAL IMPACT

25. Q. Do you think that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia will pose a major threat to Israel's security?

26. Q. Can't Saudi AWACS be used to guide other Arab planes in an attack on Israel?

27. Q. Won't AWACS give Saudi Arabia information on Israel's military activities?

28. Q. Won't Saudi AWACS take away Israel's qualitative edge?

29. Q. How do you assess Israel's current and projected capabilities to defend itself against a coordinated Arab attack?

30. Q. Can you evaluate the possible military impact on Israel of this sale?

31. Q. Has Saudi Arabia been a participant in previous Arab/Israeli conflicts?

32. Q. Do you propose to compensate Israel if Saudi Arabia receives this equipment?

33. Q. Won't this sale stimulate a regional arms race?

34. Q. Isn't it more likely that the Saudis will participate in a future Arab/Israeli war if they receive this equipment?

35. Q. Doesn't this sale encourage the prospect for an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia?

36. Q. Could the Saudis transfer this sophisticated equipment to other Arab states?

37. Q. If, as the Administration argues, these sales do not pose a threat to Israel, why do the Israelis oppose this sale?

Q. Do the Saudis now intend to station F-15s at Tabuk?

IV. SAUDI STABILITY

39. Q. How do you assess Saudi Arabia's stability?

40. Q. What is your analysis of last year's seizure of the Mecca Mosque?

41. Q. Does the entire Saudi Royal Family support this sale?

42. Q. Could you comment on Admiral Turner's article concerning Saudi stability?

V. SAUDI ARABIA, THE PALESTINIANS AND TERRORISM

43. Q. What is the Saudi position on the PLO and international terrorism?

44. Q. What did the Saudis mean by their call for Jihad against Israel?

45. Q. Do the Saudis support a Middle East peace?

46. Q. What is the extent and nature of Saudi aid to the PLO?

47. Q. Are there Palestinian pilots in the Saudi Air Force?

VI. SAUDI MILITARY CAPABILITIES

48. Q. What is the value of Saudi military purchases?

49. Q. If the Saudis bought the AWACS, would they be able to operate it alone during the next decade?

50. Q. What is Saudi Arabia's manpower capacity to absorb this equipment? How many US personnel will need to be sent to Saudi Arabia?

VII. ADDENDA

51. Q. What exactly does the AWACS package consist of?

Q. Why has the value of the package increased so dramatically?

54. Q. Will the intelligence "take" be shared?

55. Q. What will be the delivery schedule on F-15s?

56. Q. What will be the status of U.S. personnel in a Saudi

57. Q. If sensitive technologies in AWACS fell into hostile hands, would U.S. security be adversely affected?

58. Q. Will sensitive equipment from U.S. AWACS be installed on the Saudi version?

59. Q. Why are you announcing the proposed AWACS/F-15 enhancement package today, rather than at the time Congress reconvenes on September 9?

1. Q. What is an AWACS?

A. AWACS stands for Airborne Warning and Control System. It is essentially a flying radar that can detect aircraft flying as far away as 250 miles. The AWACS also has on-board computers and communication equipment that enable it to pass information rapidly to air defense fighters and ground anti-aircraft weapons.

2. Q. Why do the Saudis need AWACS?

A. Saudi oil fields and military installations on the Persian Gulf are now highly vulnerable to attack from across the Gulf.

A ground radar's low-altitude range is limited by the horizon, i.e., about 20 miles. It therefore cannot give adequate warning. AWACS can see over 200 miles and can enable air defenses to be activated much sooner.

The danger of an attack on Saudi Arabian oil fields during the Iran-Iraq war led us to station four AWACS there last year. We believe they have contributed to deterring an Iranian attack.

3. Q. Why not sell the Saudis ground radar instead of AWACS?

A. Ground based radars are being provided to the Saudis and they, along with airborne early warning aircraft, would provide a complementary system for full time coverage adequate to protect the oil assets of Saudi Arabia. However, ground based radars in the Persian Gulf region suffer severe technical difficulties from the extreme environmental conditions in that region, are extremely difficult to support, and place an even greater drain on limited Saudi manpower. More importantly, ground based radars do not provide adequate coverage nor do they provide adequate warning time. The low level range of ground based radars is limited to about 20 miles over flat terrain (as found along the Persian Gulf coast) by the curvature of the earth and does not provide adequate warning time to locate, identify, scramble and intercept aircraft transiting the Gulf, for example, from bases in Iran. Hence a combination of airborne surveillance aircraft and ground radars provides the most cost effective solution to the overall air defense problem.

4. Q. If the Saudis do not get an aerial refueling tanker, could they use AWACS effectively?

A. Yes, the Saudis could still make effective use of AEW if an aerial refueling aircraft were not made available to them. It would, however, significantly increase the number of AEW aircraft required to perform a given mission. The unrefueled endurance of AWACS, for example, is 11 hours; an AWACS refueled twice in flight has a flight endurance time of 22 hours. Thus, for example, if it was desired to maintain 24-hour surveillance of a given orbit for an extended period of time, approximately five AWACS would be required with refueling. Without aerial refueling this requirement increases to at least ten AWACS (sortie rates have a greater impact on maintenance and aircraft requirements than sortie length). The resultant problems in providing Saudi crew members, controllers, and maintenance personnel to maintain and operate such additional aircraft would exacerbate the already formidable manpower problems facing the RSAF.

5. Q. How was the decision to sell AWACS made?

A. Both the US and Saudi Arabia have over the past several years come to realize the major contribution that AWACS could make to Saudi Arabia.

In 1979, during the period of increased regional tension caused by the outbreak of fighting between North and South Yemen, the US deployed AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia to improve Saudi air defenses along the borders with Yemen.

In February 1980 Saudi Arabia informally indicated its interest in acquiring AWACS.

In April 1980 the US agreed to conduct a study of Saudi air defense requirements as part of our ongoing program to strengthen the Saudi military.

During June 1980 meeting between SecDef Brown and Prince Sultan it was agreed that the Saudi request for AWACS would continue to be studied.

In September 1980, in response to the Iran/Iraq war, the US agreed to deploy AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia to improve its air defenses.

In December 1980 USAF completed its analysis of Saudi air defense needs. This study considered three options: improved ground radar only; improved ground radar plus the E2C; and improved ground radar plus AWACS. The study did not recommend a particular option, although it concluded that airborne early warning aircraft could significantly improve Saudi air defense capabilities.

On March 6, 1981, US announced its agreement in principle to sell airborne surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

During March 1981, a Saudi AF team travelled to Washington for more detailed discussions on the air surveillance options. During this period the Saudis decided that they preferred to buy the AWACS E3A aircraft.

6. Q. Is AWACS technology less sensitive now than when it was considered for sale to Iran?

A. Although AWACS technology is still sensitive, it is in fact, four years older than when a sale was proposed for Iran. Detailed AWACS technology has been released to NATO. Israel and Japan have received the E-2C which contains some comparable technology. Additionally it should be noted that the Soviets are already flying a system which gives them similar capability for airborne surveillance.

As in the case of AIM-9L, and the high concern for technology transfer, we are developing a formal security of information agreement with the SAG. A final assurance is that the procedures for an exception to national disclosure policy will also be followed before any sale is consumated.

7. Q. Why do the Saudis need extra fuel tanks and tankers?

A. Both would extend air defense range and loiter time and enable the Saudis to base some of their F-15s in the Southwest at distances which make them safe from a surprise pre-emptive strike from across the Gulf. Additionally, both would extend time on patrol and thus provide more complete coverage of the oil and industrial facilities.

The PEACE SUN (F-15 program) calls for the aircraft to be based at Dhahran, Taif and Khamis Mushayt.

Dhahran is located on the east coast and is tactically well positioned to provide air defense alert protection for the oil fields. However, its proximity to the threat also makes it very vulnerable and likely to be one of the first targets of any attack on Saudi Arabia from the east or north. Consequently, most operations after the first day of battle would probably have to originate at Taif or Khamis Mushayt. These bases are significant distances (up to 800 NM) from the primary area to be defended and an effective defense of the oil fields would be impossible without extending the range and/or endurance of the Saudi F-15s.

Another vital consideration is that in contingencies an airborne surveillance or defensive combat air patrol (CAP) would have to be maintained owing to the proximity of the threat. This represents a dramatic drain on aircraft resources. This is clear in our own operation of the AWACS. Even with AWACS' extended endurance it is necessary to supplement its fuel (in this case with tankers) to support orbit requirements with a small number of aircraft. With the limited numbers of Saudi F-15s, continuous

caps could be maintained from Dhahran (through maximum use of F-15 resources), but would be impossible from rear bases without supplemental fuel.

8. Q. Could a Saudi F-15, with conformal fuel tanks bomb Jerusalem?

A. No, the distance from Taif to Jerusalem is approximately 680 Nautical Miles (NM). In a typical air-to-air mission, an F-15 with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFT) and two 600 gallon External Fuel Tanks (EFT) (maximum fuel load), has a combat radius of about 850 NM. Therefore, Jerusalem is within this operating range for air to air missions. For practical purposes, (Hi-Lo-Hi) profile, and an air-to-ground configuration, Jerusalem is outside the F-15's combat radius even with conformal fuel tanks. This is because:

(i) aircraft armed with air-to-ground munitions consume more fuel than when armed with air-to-air missiles; and

(ii) low altitude penetration (necessary in a high-threat environment such as Israel) consumes more fuel.

9. Q. Is it not true that U.S. F-15s have flown nonstop directly from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia utilizing aerial refueling?

A. U.S. F-15 aircraft have not flown non-stop, with KC-135 support, from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia. On 13 January 79, 18 F-15 aircraft, with KC-135 support, flew non-stop from Langley AFB, Va. to Lajes Airfield in the Azores. On 14-15 January 79, 12 of the F-15s, with tanker support, deployed non-stop from the Azores to Saudi Arabia, with 6 aircraft going to Riyadh and 6 to Khamis Mushayt.

10. Q. Could other countries produce conformal fuel tanks?

A. As their $900,000 a pair basic price suggests, conformal fuel tanks are relatively complex sub-systems. They contain electric pumps and sensors which automatically adjust fuel levels in various compartments of the tanks to maintain the aircraft's proper center of gravity. They also permit the mounting and firing of four AIM-7 air-to-air missiles or, with modifications to the aircraft's wiring, carriage of air-to-surface ordinance on one store station for each tank.

The design and production of CFTs would be greatly complicated by the absence of manufacturer's specifications. Substitute CFTs would also need to undergo extensive flight testing on F-5s before being employed in operational units. However, given sufficient time and resources, any country with a reasonably capable aircraft industry could probably produce CFTs.

11. Q. What other countries produce tanker aircraft?

A. No country other than the US currently produces tanker-aircraft which can refuel either the F-15 or the E-3A. Both of these aircraft are configured to refuel in flight via a "boom" refueling probe.

If the Saudis were to seek an aerial refueling capability for their F-15s and E-3As from a country other than the US, they would most likely procure a probe and drogue tanker aircraft and modify their F-15s and E-3As accordingly. The UK and the Soviet Union, as well as the US have produced probe and drogue tankers. Other countries, including France, Italy, and Germany would be capable of modifying commercial aircraft for a probe and drogue tanker role and modifying Saudi F-15s and E-3As accordingly.

12. Q. Why do the Saudis need new 9L Sidewinder missles?

A. The AIM-9L air defense heat-seeking missile enables the pilot to fire from the front quadrant -- rather than from the rear only as with older models. The main benefit of this would be that Saudi fighters with AIM-9Ls could engage incoming enemy aircraft sooner and, thus, better protect facilities near the coast.

15. Q. Does the Administration intend to sell the MER-200 to Saudi Arabia? Would Congress be consulted?

A. The Saudi requirement for the MER-200 will be studied in the context of the overall Saudi Arabian defense requirement. We could not come to a conclusion on valid Saudi needs for the MER-200 until such a study is completed. Should a requirement for the MER-200 be validated by the U.S. the number of MER-200s envisioned may not meet the dollar threshold for formal notification of the Congress (36B requirement). However, we definitely intend to consult with the Congress before approving any sale of MER-200s.

16. Q. Why would the Saudis want the MER-200 bomb rack?

A. The Saudis have requested multiple ejection racks for the following reasons:

a. The RSAF has a limited number of fighter aircraft. Their 100 F-5s are primarily used for air-to-ground, but the F-5s range and payload are also very limited. Consequently, in a war with Iran or South Yemen, for example, the RSAF will need to "swing" their F-15s to the air-to-ground role to provide the required level of support. If attrition rates of the F-5 are high (as might be expected in the air-to-ground role) the RSAF would be left with little or no air-to-ground capability.

b. The limited number of RSAF personnel greatly restrict the number of aircraft that the RSAF can absorb. Consequently, the Saudis believe they need the F-15 enhancements to allow them to use the aircraft in both roles.

The CFTs have two hard points for air-to-ground munitions carriage (CFTs are mounted on the aircraft in sets of 2, 1 on each side of the fuselage). Thus, a total of two additional hard points are gained by fitting CFTs and the munitions load with CFTs would be increased to a total of five bomb stations (i.e., 2 on CFTs plus 1 on each of the 3 aircraft stores stations). Three MK-84 2000 lb bombs can now be carried on an F-15 and represent an effective load for point targets. However, loading only three area type munitions on the same three stations would provide an unsatisfactory load for attacking area targets (these munitions are small, designed to spread over larger areas,

and must be carried in large numbers to be effective). Consequently, the Saudis consider that MERs are needed to achieve this capability. This would increase the aircraft's flexibility for use against area type targets such as a mobile force, troops in the open, or close air support. However, MERS with area munitions are not considered an effective load for deep (long range) interdiction missions because heavy weights and high drag drastically reduce performance and raise fuel consumption.

The important thing to remember, however, is that the U.S. has made no commitment to furnish the MER-200 for the aircraft. This and other questions will have to be thoroughly studied with the Saudis before solutions are proposed.

17. Q. What are the new circumstances that justify abandoning the 1978 assurances to Congress on Saudi Arabian F-15s?

A. It is true that in 1978 Secretary of Defense Brown assured Congress that we did not intend to sell Conformal Fuel Pods or Multiple Ejection Bomb Racks to the Saudis and that we had no intention to provide an air refueling capability. We also stated at that time that there were no plans to sell AWACS or the AIM-9L Missile to Saudi Arabia.

I am aware of a central concern of the Congress and others in this country regarding that undertaking. The undertaking was made in consultations with the Congress. We would like the Congress to consider with us whether that decision continues to serve U.S. interests given the radically altered strategic situation in the area and the Administration's new approach to dealing with that situation.

The commitment was made in 1978. Since the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there is now a significantly greater threat to Western interests and to the security of states in the region.

-- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are currently 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan with an additional 35,000 troops actively engaged in support roles just over the Soviet border. As a result, Soviet tactical aircraft are now within range of the Hormuz Straits, through which 2/3 of the world's oil exports must pass.

-- The Iranian revolution which has turned a nation which once was an important factor in regional security into a

major element of instability in the area. We are of course concerned about the potential for Soviet exploitation of the situation in Iran.

-- The Iran/Iraq war has demonstrated again the volatility of the region and the propensity of two major states there to resort to military force and to attacks on critical oil facilities.

Add to these dramatic events the Soviet Union's position in Ethiopia and South Yemen: both of these Marxist states are tied to the Soviet Union and to each other by treaties of friendship and cooperation in which military cooperation is stated explicitly and prominently.

We have a new approach to the region to deal with this new situation. This time we have not evaluated the question of F-15 enhancement as an isolated question of U.S.-Saudi or U.S.-Israeli relation, but seen our decision in this issue as an element in our overall new strategy for dealing with the Soviet threat.

We have reviewed this question in this new context and have determined that our own interests in these changed circumstances require a fresh approach. We are consulting with you in the light of our common recognition of the altered strategic situation in the area.

We are now asking the Congress to consider with us impact of the profoundly threatening circumstances facing the West at this time, and to join the Administration in taking steps to enhance Western security in the region. These additional resources to Saudi Arabia, and the measures proposed to assure

the continuing viability of Israel's defenses are contributions to our new approach.

18. Q. Can you describe the Soviet threat to Saudi Arabia?

A. Russian ambitions in the Persian Gulf predate the Bolshevik Revolution and as a world power the Soviet Union has long had an interest in political influence in this strategic part of the world.

The discovery of vast oil wealth, one-half of the world's reserves, has made the Persian Gulf area critical to world peace and prosperity. Over half of this oil is in Saudi Arabia. There are indications that the Soviet Union may in coming years become dependent itself on foreign oil; if so, its interest in influencing the Persian Gulf region will intensify.

Through many difficult years Saudi Arabia has been the bulwark of resistance to the spread of communist influence in the area. The Saudis fear keenly the Soviet threat, and have good reason.

To the north, the current Iran-Iraq conflict points out the volatility of the region and the current political weakness of the Iranian Government offers the Soviets the opportunity to expand their influence.

In the south of Arabia, the Soviet Union, over a decade ago, established a foothold in South Yemen in the former British colony of Aden. South Yemen appears increasingly to be a Soviet base of influence. Its well trained military is Soviet supplied. The Soviets enjoy naval facilities in Aden. The Soviets used South Yemen as a staging point to supply Ethiopia during the 1979 Horn of Africa hostilities. Soviet and Cuban advisers are in

South Yemen and South Yemeni military forces fought along side Russian and Cubans in the Horn of Africa.

South Yemen has long played a destabilizing role in the region. There have been three military engagements between South Yemeni and Saudi forces in border areas since 1969. Soviet-supported South Yemen supported a long rebellion in Oman and continues to support Omani opposition groups.

The Saudi see a Soviet threat in the Horn of Africa. The Saudis have supported Somalia in breaking its ties with the Soviet Union but the Soviets today are in a strong position in Ethiopia.

Thus, the Saudis feel pressured by the Soviet Union on virtually all sides.

Saudi Arabia has been resolute in its resistance to Soviet designs.

It is in our own interest that it remain so.

Saudi Arabia looks to U.S. support in developing its defense capability so that it can improve the security of its strategic energy resources.

U.S. national security requires a militarily strong Saudi Arabia.

19. Q: Don't the Saudis believe that Israel is a greater threat to them than the Soviet Union? Didn't Oil Minister Yamani recently state this?

A: On April 23, Minister Yamani stated in a speech in New York, "To the Saudis, there are only two threats in this world: international communism and Israel. The first helps to reinforce our friendship with America, while the second is a threat to that friendship. It is difficult to conceive of a compromise in a situation like this. The second is far more tangible and more in evidence than the first one, and an actual danger is obviously worse than a potential danger." His remarks should be understood against the background of recent history in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia has never engaged Israel in significant, sustained combat in any Arab-Israel war. Nevertheless, it is true that the Saudis share a view common in the Arab world that Israeli activities have created opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence. The Saudis argue that such Israeli activities as the annexation of East Jerusalem and the establishment of settlements on the West Bank push moderate Palestinian and Arab elements into cooperation with the Soviet Union, which has consistently supported the Arab position on Arab-Israeli issues.

While we may have some differences with the Saudis on particular points, we do share with them an understanding of the dangers to the Middle East from Soviet activities. The Saudis have in fact, been a leading force in counering Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the area. The Saudis led the Islamic world in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They encouraged the forces that led to the

29

expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. The Saudis are working with us to support the economic and defense needs of North Yemen as an alternative to its reliance on Soviet arms and aid. There can be no doubt that the Saudis clearly recognize the dangers of Soviet expansionism.

We justify selling the AWACS to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that it is in the interest of Saudi Arabia, ourselves and our non-communist friends that the Saudi oil fields be adequately protected against destruction by air attack. We also justify the sale on grounds that US readiness to assist our friends in the Middle East with their legitimate defense requirements is essential to demonstrate our reliability as a security partner. Helping friends like the Saudis to defend themselves is the first line in building our own defenses in that vital region.

Regarding Middle East peace, the Saudis have said that in their view the Camp David agreements are inadequate for a comprehensive settlement because they do not deal sufficiently with the Palestinian question and the status of Jerusalem. We will continue to seek to bring the Saudis into a more supportive posture with respect to our ongoing efforts under the Camp David agreements. In this regard, it is important to sustain their confidence in other aspects of US policy, including our willingness to support their security.

20. Q. To what degree do the Saudis see these sales in political terms as a test of will - as opposed to their military requirements for this equipment?

A. The Saudis believe that there is a pressing military need to enhance the capabilities of their F-15 aircraft and to acquire an airborne early warning capability. They see this need as arising out of the changed military situation in the area, including the increased Soviet threat exemplified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Saudis believe it essential that they possess an improved air defense capability to deter external attack.

The Saudis do not see this as a "test of the will" with the United States although our response inevitably will be viewed by the Saudis as an indication of US willingness to work together in pursuit of our common security objectives against the Soviet advance. They believe that the US shares an interest in the stability of the region and the defense of the Saudi oil facilities and that it is in our joint interest to improve Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its strategically important natural resources.

21. Q. What happens if we don't sell this equipment to Saudi Arabia?

A. These sales are one part of an overall strategy by which we want to convince the Saudis that we are very seriously committed to defending our friends in the region against the danger of the Soviet Union and the forces it controls. If, over the long term, we fail to convince Saudi Arabia of this commitment, we might see a dangerous evolution in Saudi attitudes away from us.

With regard to this particular part of our strategy, we would not expect Saudi Arabia to retaliate in some direct overt fashion against the US should we fail to supply these items. We believe the Saudi reaction rather would be one of deep disappointment and disillusionment. It would be at the critical margins of the relationship that our interests would suffer. Without confidence in the reliability of our commitment to the country's security, the Saudis may find it politically more difficult to take -- but from our standpoint necessary -- decisions regarding regional security, oil production and supply, international financial cooperation, and Middle East peace.

While neither we nor the Saudis expect direct linkages or trade-offs, we believe that helping to provide for Saudi security will improve the atmosphere in which we seek increasing Saudi cooperation in our strategy for securing the region against Soviet aggression.

If the sales of enhancement items are not approved, the Saudis could go elsewhere to procure the capabilities. The French appear to be willing to sell F-1s, Mirage 2000s and, later, the Mirage 4000 with air-ground capability. There have been indications that the Saudis may also be considering the European Tornado as an

alternative. The UK has refueling aircraft and AWACS-type capability in their Nimrod. The Saudis could cancel the F-15 program (total cost: over $5 billion), although a recent (February 24th) signature of an F-15 logistics support package indicates their strong desire to maintain close ties to the US Government. Clearly, a Saudi move to non-US military equipment would reduce US influence with the Saudis and could, therefore, constitute a threat to Israeli interests as well as those of the United States.

22. Q. Aren't we meeting the Saudi request primarily because they have us over the oil barrel?

A. Both we and the Saudis are convinced that there is a sound military justification for the sale of AWACS to the Kingdom. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, and the belligerents' use of airpower to destroy each other's oil facilities, highlighted to the Saudis the potential vulnerability of their oil facilities and other installations to air attack. The AWACS will provide a major boost for Saudi air defense capabilities in this vital area that cannot be achieved by any other means.

Neither we nor the Saudis have ever established a direct linkage between arms sales and oil pricing or production. However, we believe that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share a common interest in a continuing arms supply relationship, as well as cooperation in oil pricing and production policies.

23. Q. What "quid" will we receive from the Saudis? Don't they benefit more from our bilateral relationship than the US?

A. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is mutually beneficial. It is incorrect to state that the Saudis gain more than the United States from this relationship.

The Saudis maintain that a number of their policies have significantly supported U.S. interests:

-- maintaining oil production higher than preferred levels (for example, increasing production to 10 mbpd to offset shortages resulting from the Iran-Iraq war);

-- pricing of Saudi crude oil well below the general OPEC level;

-- devoting a high percentage (almost 10%) of their GNP to foreign assistance which in many cases complements U.S. efforts to support moderate regimes;

-- taking the lead in organizing regional opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

We believe that the sale of this equipment to Saudi Arabia will improve the prospects for even greater mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

24. Q. Why not simply continue the current deployment of US AWACS instead of selling this aircraft to the Saudis?

A. Saudi Arabia believes that as a sovereign nation it has both the right and the duty to provide for its own defenses. The Saudis, like the Israelis and others, have repeatedly indicated that they want to be able to defend themselves to the greatest extent possible without being dependent on foreign help.

Recognizing that they lacked adequate early warning capabilities to assure the protection of their oil fields and installations in the crisis days following the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war, the Saudis asked for U.S. assistance through the temporary deployment of U.S. AWACS. However, the clear long term Saudi objective has been to acquire over time the sophisticated military equipment they need to defend themselves. Neither the Saudi rulers nor the Saudi military leaders find acceptable the permanent presence of U.S. AWACS and U.S. military personnel on their territory. They believe this would be inconsistent with their sovereignty, they would prefer to acquiretheir own airborne surveillance system and to defend themselves to the best of their capabilities.

It must also be noted that an indefinite deployment of USAF AWACS to Saudi Arabia would have significant negative implications for the readiness of our AWACS assets elsewhere. Such a deployment would stretch our AWACS logistics support system to its limits.

In addition, Saudi ownership of AWACS can help promote greater regional air defense among the smaller Gulf states.

We expect that as part of our broader security relationship with Saudi Arabia -- and the Saudis' continuing need for training, support and maintenance -- we will be cooperating closely with the

Saudis in AWACS operations. At this stage it would be premature to discuss the modalities of such cooperation. This topic will be addressed fully during the Congressional review process.

25. Q. Do you think that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia will pose a major threat to Israel's security?

A. No. Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia would not constitute a realistic threat to Israel. The reasons for this are:

-- AWACS would be used primarily to protect Saudi oil fields;

-- AWACS essentially is a flying radar platform which can detect and follow movements of airborne aircraft. It cannot detect militarily significant ground activity, it will have no radio monitoring, photoreconaissance or intelligence gathering capabilities;

-- it could not be used with the combat aircraft of other countries without extensive joint training and US-supplied computer and communications equipment;

-- Saudi AWACS operations will depend on US spare parts, maintenance and support of operations;

-- and an AWACS aircraft flying close enough to Israel to monitor its aircraft would be vulnerable to being shot down by Israeli fighter aircraft.

Obviously, prudent Israeli planners would have to take a Saudi AWACS into account in their calculations. But the overwhelming impact of the sale will be to enhance Saudi defensive capabilities -- not to threaten Israel.

25. Q. Can't Saudi AWACS be used to guide other Arab planes in an attack on Israel?

A. For a Saudi AWACS to cooperate effectively with other Arab countries would require extensive advance planning, training, and compatible secure communications systems using US equipment.

None of this would be in accord with our sales agreement with Saudi Arabia. There is no reason to believe Saudi Arabia has any intention to violate our agreement. We would be aware if Saudi Arabia began to make such preparations.

27. Q. Won't AWACS give Saudi Arabia information on Israel's military activities?

A. The Saudi AWACS will not have intelligence monitoring capability.

AWACS can identify aircraft only when they are airborne, not on the ground.

To cover all of Israel AWACS would have to fly close to the Israeli border and run the risk of being shot down.

28. Q. Won't Saudi AWACS take away Israel's qualitative edge?

A. Saudi Arabia has stated it has no aggressive intentions against any nation.

Israel has one of the world's most effective air defense systems. It is very unlikely that Saudi aircraft would successfully defeat those defenses.

Should Saudi AWACS be moved in periods of tension into positions which Israel considered seriously threatening they would be extremely vulnerable to Israeli attack. More broadly, would Saudi Arabia attack Israel, Saudi facilities would be highly vulnerable to counter attack.

Saudi Arabia is well aware of the importance we attach to Israel's security; we regard it as extremely unlikely that Saudi Arabia would jeopardize its entire defense relationship with the U.S. by an attack on Israel. Saudi Arabia will need to rely on U.S. military support for the foreseeable future.

29. Q. How do you assess Israel's current and projected capabilities to defend itself against a coordinated Arab attack?

A. It is our judgement that with a sustained effort and US assistance, Israel will be able to maintain its margin of militarysuperiority over the Arab states during at least the next five years, and will remain capable of defeating any combination of Arab forces. Nonetheless, improvements in Arab military capabilities could make Israel's military preparations for a possible future conflict more complex and more costly.

30. Q. Can you evaluate the possible military impact on Israel of this sale?

A. We looked carefully at the effect that the sale of this equipment would have on the military balance in the region in general, and upon the security of Israel in particular. We want to be absolutely assured of the continued adequacy of Israel's defenses, and we have carefully considered Israel's concerns about the sale of this equipment to Saudi Arabia. Of course, if viewed in isolation from our overall strategy for the region, the Saudi F-15 enhancement items and airborne surveillance aircraft do not benefit Israel. In fact, viewed narrowly, providing arms to Saudi Arabia increases Israel's perceived military threat.

We do not believe that the sale of this equipment to Saudi Arabia poses a major threat to Israel. In our view, Israel's well trained and highly effective air defense system, including sophisticated aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16, and point defensive missile and gun systems, provides a substantial deterrent to any potential Saudi attack, with or without the additional equipment for the F-15s. The Saudis also know that the Israeli Air Force could strike back into central Saudi Arabia with devastating effect. In other words, commitment of Saudi forces against Israel would result in their almost inevitable loss, and would expose Saudi Arabia to attack from potential adversaries to the east and south.

The Saudis are well aware of this situation, and know that their forces are not well matched against the well equipped and

highly trained Israelis, whether alone or in concert with other states in the region.

In sum, during our deliberations on this matter, we recognized that these systems do provide Saudi Arabia with additional military capability which the Israelis feel they must take into account. While obviously it is not possible to rule out absolutely the use of Saudi F-15s equipped with enhancement items against Israel, an objective analysis would rate both the likelihood of such use, and the probability of success in the unlikely event such use occurred, to be quite low.

31. Q. Has Saudi Arabia been a participant in previous Arab/Israeli conflicts?

A. Saudi Arabia has avoided combat in Arab/Israeli conflicts, although in 1973 a Saudi brigade moving toward a reserve position in Syria was involved in a brief skirmish with Israeli forward patrols. The Saudis are believed to have suffered 10 casualties. These troops did not join the Golan Heights fighting.

In 1976, the Saudis withdrew the limited land forces that they had maintained in Syria and Jordan, partially to avoid entanglement in a future conflict.

During the October 1973 war, the Saudis sent eight Italian-made Agusta-Bell helicopters to operate in rearward areas of Egypt on logistic support missions. These helicopters, flown exclusively by Saudi pilots, were sold by the Italian firm Agusta-Bell on direct commercial contract from the Italian company to the Saudi Air Force. They did not engage in combat.

32. Q: Do you propose to compensate Israel if Saudi Arabia receives this equipment?

A: We recognize that the Israeli Government has expressed concern about the Saudi acquisition of this equipment. Our assessment of these concerns differs. This Administration remains committed to Israel's security and will ensure that Israel's defenses remain strong. We are convinced that the regional balance of forces will not be affected by this sale. One of the items to reassure Israel would be by providing additional FMS credits, but no decision on this question has been made. We have an ongoing dialogue with Israel about its security needs in the 1980s.

33. Q. Won't this sale stimulate a regional arms race?

A. Saudi Arabia possesses the smallest military forces of any major state in Southwest Asia. Because the size of its military is constrained by the relatively small size of its population, Saudi Arabia has concentrated its efforts to acquire higher technology arms systems that multiply the effectiveness of its smaller armed forces.

The F-15 enhancement items and AWACS we propose to sell to the Saudis will significantly improve Saudi Arabia's ability to defend its vital natural resources.

There is no reason why the sale of this equipment to improve Saudi air defenses should lead to an arms race in the region. We believe that Israel continues to have a qualitative edge over its Arab neighbors. The U.S. has repeatedly stated that we will ensure that Israel maintains this advantage.

34. Q. Isn't it more likely that the Saudis will participate in a future Arab/Israeli war if they receive this equipment?

A. Each Letter of Offer contract (DD Form 1513) contains several conditions of sale including the condition that the articles and services to be provided cannot be retransferred to a Third Country without the prior approval of the USG. In all of our conversations with the Saudis -- and we have talked to the highest levels -- they have indicated that they will abide by the provisions under which the United States supplies military equipment. The Saudi record in this regard during the past has been excellent.

The Saudi leaders have repeatedly assured us they have no aggressive intentions against any state in the region. In discussions with Executive Branch officials and Members of Congress, the Saudis have stressed the defensive nature of Saudi Arabia's armed forces modernization program and given assurances they will not train the pilots of other Arab countries on the F-15 or transfer the aircraft to Third Countries without U.S. approval.

There are substantial reasons for Saudi Arabia to avoid participation in a conflict with Israel even with the additional equipment for the F-15s in their possession. The Saudis are very much aware that the Israelis have a highly effective air defense system, including Israeli interceptor aircraft (F-15s, F-16s, KFIRS and F-4s) which could engage the attackers well outside of Israel's borders, a surface-to-air missile ring (I-Hawk/Basic Hawk), and various air defense artillery and missile point defense systems. This Israeli air defense system is highly

effective and the crews are well trained.

The Saudis also know that the Israeli air force could strike back into central Saudi Arabia. Additionally, commitment of forces against Israel and their almost inevitable loss would expose Saudi Arabia to attack from adversaries to the East and South.

35. Q. Doesn't this sale encourage the prospect for an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia?

A. Saudi Arabia has abstained from any significant combat in previous Arab-Israeli wars and any threatening gestures toward Israel. Under these circumstances, and considering Saudi Arabia's intentions to use the F-15 defensively and not to deploy it so as to provoke an Israeli attack, we regard an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia as unlikely.

36. Q. Could the Saudis transfer this sophisticated equipment to other Arab states?

A. Saudi Arabia has agreed, in signing the sales contract for the F-15, not to transfer them to third countries without our approval in advance. Thus, a transfer is very unlikely, although theoretically possible; the Saudis would have to anticipate that such an action would disrupt the good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In the event of an unauthorized transfer, the US could stop the flow of support, rendering the F-15s and other major US-origin systems (I-HAWK, F-5s) ineffective and severely weakening Saudi defenses.

In addition, the very nature of the F-15 weapons systems makes it difficult to transfer, in the sense of transferring an effective combat capability. No other Arab nation would have the trained pilots or technicians, ground support equipment, spare parts inventory or munitions to support F-15s.

Finally, preparations for such a transfer could not be accomplished without US personnel becoming aware.

37. Q. If, as the Administration argues, these sales do not pose a threat to Israel, why do the Israelis oppose this sale?

A. The United States has discussed our proposals extensively with Israel. Israel has made it clear that they oppose arms sales to any Arab state. Israel is concerned that the items we have proposed could sufficiently enhance the range and capability of the F-15 to enable it to pose a threat to Israel.

We recognize that the systems we are proposing for sale would provide Saudi Arabia with additional capabilities and complicate Israeli defense planning. But, because of considerations such as Israel's highly effective air defense system and Israel's ability to retaliate effectively, which provide an effective deterrent as well as defense, we rate the risk of use of the Saudi F-15 against Israel as low.

38. Q. Do the Saudis now intend to station F-15s at Tabuk?

A. There is no reason to believe the Saudis have modified the assurance they gave us regarding the stationing of F-15s. The Saudis intend to develop Khamis Mushayt, Taif and Dhahran, not Tabuk, as the main operating bases for the F-15.

There is no evidence that the Saudis have any plans to base F-15s at Tabuk or to build hardened aircraft shelters there to accommodate the F-15s.

39. Q. How do you assess Saudi Arabia's stability?

A. We believe that the differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran under the rule of the Shah are greater than are the similiarities.

-- For a variety of reasons -- including size of population, historic experience, legitimacy and broad public acceptance of the ruling order, the relationship of the regime to the national religion -- the Saudi experience is not comparable to that of Iran.

-- Saudi society has demonstrated a high degree of adaptability while undergoing rapid economic and social change.

-- The Saudi leadership remains in close contact with its people and has sought to carry forward national development while maintaining and strengthening its commitment to the Islamic values of the society.

-- In fact, Saudi Arabia has been one of our most stable friends. We believe that the incident last year at the Grand Mosque in Mecca was an aberration that does not reflect any widespread dissatisfaction among the Saudi populace.

40. Q. What is your analysis of last year's seizure of the Mecca Mosque?

A. The seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by a small group of religious fanatics lasted about two weeks. During this period the Saudi military forces moved cautiously against the rebels in order not to cause undue damage to the Mosque or to cause the death of the hold hostage inside. Moreover, the labyrinth of catacombs under the Mosque provided a very large number of hiding places for the rebels. As you are aware, the Saudis were able to capture or kill all of the rebels in the Mosque. Those captured, after investigation and judgment under Islamic judicial proceedings, were later executed. We view the seizure of the Grand Mosque by this small group as an aberation that did not undercut the prospects for stability in Saudi Arabia.

41. Q. Does the entire Saudi Royal Family support this sale?

A. Yes, our wide contacts with the Saudi royal family have shown that it is united in support of this sale.

If the sale were rejected, it would be seen as a personnel rebuff of the Saudi regime and thus could damage the position of the royal family.

42. Q. Could you comment on Admiral Turner's article concerning Saudi stability?

A. There are three principal points in Admiral Turner's article. We do not share Admiral Turner's analysis of Saudi Arabia's requirements for defense or his view of the dangers of instability in the Kingdom. The Admiral is also overly critical, in our view, of the Saudi ability to handle sophisticated military equipment.

We do not believe Admiral Turner would dispute the need to help Saudi Arabia improve its air defenses against the potential threat of aggression from across the Persian Gulf. It is this threat that has led us to deploy four AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. It is the judgment of our military analysts that the AWACS is the most effective means of improving an air defense system in conditions of vulnerability such as Saudi Arabia experiences. There is simply no way that ground-based radars can provide the necessary early warning that is available from an airborne radar platform.

In our opinion, Admiral Turner's references to possible guerrilla warfare and instability on the Saudi domestic scene seriously misread the prospects for political order in Saudi Arabia, which we consider encouraging. For a variety of reasons -- including size of population, historic experience, legitmacy and broad public acceptance of the ruling order, the relationship of the regime to the national religion -- the Saudi experience is not comparable to that of Iran.

In fact, Saudi Arabia has been one of our most stable friends. Saudi society has demonstrated a high degree of adaptability while

undergoing rapid economic and social changes. The Saudi leadership remains in close contact with its people and has sought to carry forward national development while maintaining and strengthening its commitment to the Islamic values of the society.

While it is true that the Saudi Armed Forces face serious problems in mastering sophisticated military equipment, substantial progress has been registered to date. In our experience, critics of the capabilities of the Saudi military overstate the problems in general and undervalue the ability of Saudi personnel to handle new equipment and new missions.

This being said, however, it will clearly be necessary for the foreseeable future for U.S. personnel to assist Saudi Arabia in the support of the new sophisticated weapons systems the Kingdom is acquiring. The continuing close relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the defense of the Kingdom serves important U.S. and Saudi strategic and economic interests.

43. Q. What is the Saudi position on the PLO and international terrorism?

A. Saudi Arabia, in common with all of the Arab states, recognizes the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." In accord with the new Administration's heightened concern about international terrorism, this is a topic of concern for us. But Saudi support for the PLO needs to be carefully understood.

Saudi Arabia has been a leading supporter of those elements within the PLO who support a political rather than a military solution to the Palestinian problem. This is in line with Saudi interests, since the most extreme Palestinian elements advocate social revolution in the region.

This political approach is consistent with the Saudi Government position that it would be contrary to Saudi policy to provide support for terrorism (see attached Saudi statement).

Saudi Arabia through the years has used its influence with the Palestinians to strengthen the hand of more moderate elements. The Saudis persistently have argued that the Palestinians should reject the use of international terrorism as a policy instrument and should, instead, seek their objectives through political means, including negotiations.

The Saudis were the primary force behind the Inter-Arab Agreement that brought the civil conflict in Lebanon to an end in late 1976. The Saudi organized mini-summit resulted in the first ever Arab public condemnation of the Palestinians for challenging the legitimate Government of Lebanon.

In the past, the Saudis have sought to persuade the PLO leadership to accept Security Council Resolution 242. And of course, the SAudis worked successfully with us to achieve the recent ceasefire in Lebanon.

44. Q. What did the Saudis mean by their call for Jihad against Israel?

A. Crown Prince Fahd referred to Jihad in August 1980 in the form of a rhetorical question. This reference to Jihad coincided with the Knesset's passage of a bill declaring all Jerusalem the capital of Israel and one of the holiest of Muslim holy days, Id Al-Fitr.

Although, the proper Quranic translation of "jihad" is "holy war", the term took on a more general meaning in the 19th and 20th centuries to rally support for nationalist struggles. In the Saudi context, Jihad is a way to dramatize the continuing view of the Arab world that Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

A major element of the Royal Family's legitimacy both at home and in the Muslim world is its role as protector of the holy places and defender of the faith. Therefore, it is not surprising that on the Muslim holy day, Fahd reacted so vigorously in response to the Knesset vote.

More recently, the final communique of the Islamic Summit concluded in Taif expressed the Jihad call as follows:

> "The Kings, Amirs, and Presidents of Islamic countries have agreed to declare holy Jihad for salvaging Al-Quds Al-Sharif (blessed Jerusalem), supporting the Palestinian people, and bringing about Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. In their resolve to launch Jihad, the Islamic states have made it clear that Jihad

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وزارة الخارجية
سفارة المملكة العربية السعودية في واشنطن
ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

March 14, 1978

An official spokesman of the Government of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh issued the following statement:

"Saudi Arabia condemns terrorism in all its forms. Those who have committed it on innocent people inevitably draw counter-terrorism on other innocent people. Consequently, and in pursuing the objective of an equitable and honorable peace in the Middle East, the Saudi Arabian Government has supported, and will continue to support the positive actions of the Government of the United States leading to a swift and just settlement for all parties concerned."

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has its Islamic concept that permits no misinterpretations or misunderstandings. They have also agreed that the practical measures to put Jihad into effect would be taken in accordance with the Islamic concept of Jihad and in continuous consultation among themselves."

The statement leaves the meaning of Jihad itself purposely vague by declaring that it needs no interpretation.

In a June 27, 1981 interview and probably in response to the widespread public commentary on his previous usage of the term, Fahd went out of his way to qualify his call for Jihad, which he said was intended to be Jihad of the spirit -- and exercise of self-discipline -- and not and exercise of guns and fighting.

Saudi statements on Jihad reflect Saudi frustration with the lack of progress on the autonomy talks and Saudi belief that Israeli settlements and the Jerusalem vote are a barrier to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

45. Q. Do the Saudis support a Middle East peace?

A. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly indicated to us that it shares the U.S. goal of achieving a just and comprehensive Middle East peace, on the basis of Resolution 242. Crown Prince Fahd has recently outlined an eight-point approach on how to achieve such a peace. The Saudis differ with us on how to achieve peace. For example, they rejected the Camp David approach because in their view, it does not adequately deal with the Jerusalem and Palestinian issues and that by splitting Arab ranks it has made attainment of a comprehensive solution more difficult.

The Saudis have long urged U.S. pressure on Israel to obtain different Israeli positions on the West Bank/Gaza and Jerusalem issues.

In inter-Arab and Islamic Councils Saudi Arabia has advocated using Arab and Islamic economic, political, and military resources to support the national rights of the Palestinian people, to achieve Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and to solve the Jerusalem problem.

The Saudis advocate direct U.S. contacts with the PLO as the "sole legal representative" of the Palestinians in order to bring the Palestinians into the peace process. The Saudis insist upon Palestinian self-determination, including the choice of a separate Palestinian state.

The Saudis argue that the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement has split Egypt from the Arab world, thus weakening the

moderate Arab camp and creating opportunities for Soviet influence.

Senior Saudi officials argue that the U.S. will have difficulty in establishing a working relationship in the Arab World to resist the Soviet threat as long as the Arab-Israeli problem continues.

Saudi Arabia has a particularly important role in the Middle East peace process because of its influence with the various Arab parties. This influence is based on its Islamic stature, its financial power, and the fact that it is not a confrontation state or a direct party to the peace negotiations.

46. Q. What is the extent and nature of Saudi aid to the PLO?

A. Saudi Arabia, in common with all of the Arab states, recognizes the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

Saudi Arabia has been a leading supporter of those elements within the PLO who support a political rather than a military solution to the Palestinian problem. This is in line with Saudi interests, since the most extreme Palestinian elements advocate social revolution in the region.

Saudi Arabia is a major contributor to the PLO. We are not aware of the precise amount of Saudi financial assistance, but Saudi Arabia, at the Rabat Conference, committed itself to an annual level of financial support of about $72 million. We assume that this amount is a general indicator of the degree of Saudi financial support.

The Saudis persistently have argued that the Palestinians should reject the use of international terrorism as a policy instrument and should, instead, seek their objectives through political means including negotiations. In this context, Saudi Arabia, through the years, has used its influence with the Palestinians to strengthen the hand of more moderate elements.

47. Q. Are there Palestinian pilots in the Saudi Air Force?

A. There are no Palestinian pilots in the Saudi Air Force. Given the large number of U.S. instructors and contract maintenance personnel involved in U.S. aircraft programs for the Saudi Air Force, it is highly unlikely we would be unaware of non-Saudis having unauthorized access to or flying in aircraft we have supplied.

48. Q. What is the value of Saudi military purchases?

A. A distinction must be drawn between FMS purchases by a country and "arms sales." FMS purchases by Saudi Arabia between FY 50-80 total approximately $35 billion. However, only a small portion of this -- about $5.5 billion -- has been for weapons and ammunition. More than half the total has been for supporting equipment and services, including $18.2 billion for the total cost of construction contracts managed by the Corps of Engineers. About 30% of total FMS sales have been for support services -- training contract management, spare parts, supplies, etc.

49. Q. If the Saudis bought the AWACS, would they be able to operate it alone during the next decade?

A. If an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft were released to the Saudis, first deliveries would occur in CY 85 or CY 86. The Saudis could be trained to operate and maintain an AEW within a few years using a combination of US military and contractor trainers. However, due to manpower constraints it is unlikely that the Saudis would be able to assume the full responsibility for AEW maintenance without substantial contractor support for the foreseeable future. Such US support gives us considerable practical control over the utilization of the AEW aircraft. US military or contractor personnel would not fly AEW operational missions in Saudi aircraft unless faced with a crisis which affected US national interests and then only by agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Governments.

50. Q. What is Saudi Arabia's manpower capacity to absorb this equipment? How many US personnel will need to be sent to Saudi Arabia?

A. Both we and the Saudis have long recognized that a shortage of trained manpower could limit Saudi ability to absorb U.S. military equipment. Saudi Arabia has a long range training program to provide the necessary operations and maintenance skills for its military personnel.

Until Saudi personnel acquire these skills, U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel will play an important role in supporting Saudi military equipment.

There are currently about 500 U.S. military personnel and 3,000 U.S. civilian contractor personnel in Saudi Arabia in connection with ongoing military programs.

We estimate that about 600-700 additional USG military and civilian personnel and about 650 civilian contractor personnel will be needed in Saudi Arabia in support of the additional equipment under consideration. These personnel would be phased out as trained Saudis become available to take their place. However, about 300 U.S. civilian contractor personnel will be needed in Saudi Arabia to help support the AWACS, F-15, and tanker systems there.

51. Q. What exactly does the AWACS package consist of?

A. The proposed Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) enhancement package consists of 101 ship-sets of F-15 conformal fuel tanks (CFTs), 1,177 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, 6 KC-707 aerial refueling aircraft (with an option for two more), and 5 E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, all with associated [illegible], support and training, and related ground equipment. The total cost of the package is $8.5 billion.

52. COST OF THE SAUDI AWACS PACKAGE

Q. The cost of the Saudi AWACS package is now valued at about $8.5 billion, almost $4 billion more than the estimate you gave Congress this spring. How do you account for this dramatic increase in the value of the package?

A. -- THE COST ESTIMATES WE GAVE IN THE SPRING WERE EXACTLY THAT -- ROUGH ESTIMATES, AS WE SAID AT THE TIME.

-- IN FURTHER DEVELOPING THE DETAILS AND COST BREAKDOWN OF THE PACKAGE, WE HAVE INCLUDED THE $1.5 BILLION COST TO THE SAUDIS OF UPGRADING THE EXISTING GROUND ENVIRONMENT PORTION OF THEIR AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

-- IN ADDITION, USING THE E-3A AIRFRAME FOR THE AERIAL REFUELING AIRCRAFT TURNED OUT TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE EXPENSIVE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED.

-- THE $8.5 BILLION FIGURE ALSO INCLUDES ALL OF THE ASSOCIATED SPARES, SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR THE AWACS AND AERIAL REFUELING AIRCRAFT, F-15 FUEL TANKS AND AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES WE PROPOSE TO SELL TO SAUDI ARABIA.

54. Q. Will the intelligence "take" be shared?

A. Although the AWACS, like other aircraft, has onboard radio receivers, it does not possess radio monitoring, photo reconnaissance, or other intelligence gathering capabilities. Therefore, there will be no "intelligence take" per se from the Saudi AWACS.

55. Q. What will be the delivery schedule on F-15s?

A. The first six (of a total of 62) Saudi Arabian F-15s are scheduled to be delivered to Luke AFB, outside Phoenix, Arizona beginning in September 1981 to accommodate initial Saudi F-15 pilot training. All six of these aircraft are then to be delivered to Saudi Arabia approximately one year later. The first in-country deliveries of F-15s to Saudi Arabia are currently scheduled to begin in January 1982 and run through the second quarter of CY 84 (only 60 F-15s are to be delivered to Saudi Arabia; the remaining two aircraft will be retained in the U.S. as attrition spares).

56. Q. If Saudi Arabia becomes involved in armed conflict and it is determined that U.S. personnel necessary for the support or operation of U.S. provided equipment are not to be involved, how will U.S. personnel and sensitive technologies and components be protected?

A. The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) has agreed to afford U.S. provided equipment with sensitive technologies and components the same level of protection as provided by the U.S. Government. The SAG has fulfilled its responsibilities in the past and we believe the SAG will fulfill its responsibilities during a conflict.

Physical protection of U.S. personnel would be dependent on the scenario and keyed to such variables as the warning time required to remove personnel, the nature of the conflict, the vulnerability to actual danger, the identification of the opponent force(s), etc. However, in all but minor contingencies, continued U.S. support of a non-combatant nature would be needed by the Saudis if they were to continue military operations for an extended period of time. In such cases, we feel confident of our ability, and that of the Saudis, to protect U.S. personnel and technologies.

57. Q: (U) If sensitive technologies in AWACS fell into hostile hands, would US security be adversely affected?

A: (U) Concerns over loss or compromise of sensitive technology fall into two categories: possible Soviet exploitation of US AWACS technology to counter AWACS operations through jamming and application of US technology to advance Soviet airborne early warning systems. Neither concern is well founded.

(U) The AWACS pulse doppler radar is based upon mid-sixties, textbook technology. An equivalent of the AWACS computer is available commercially. The only sensitive portion of the technology is the computer software that integrates the entire system. If compromised, the job of reverse engineering that software would be extremely difficult. Should such compromise occur, however, exploitation of the system to enhance Soviet jamming of AWACS could be easily avoided by changing the logic key to the software, which would take only about one week.

(U) Additionally, delivery of the Saudi AWACS will not begin until late 1985. Prior to that delivery, an extensive security protection program will be implemented to include procedures, devices, and facilities needed to protect AWACS equipment in Saudi Arabia.

(U) Finally, application of AWACS technology to Soviet airborne early warning systems is not of great concern. The Soviets are currently developing a new airborne early warning aircraft with capabilities estimated to be quite similar to those of US AWACS. By 1985, when the first AWACS will be delivered to Saudi Arabia, it is safe to assume that the Soviets will have an airborne surveillance platform deployed that is as good as the 20-year-old technology of the AWACS.

58. Q: (U) Will sensitive equipment from US AWACS be installed on the Saudi version?

A: (U) Some sensitive systems on the USAF AWACS will not be included on Saudi AWACS aircraft. These systems are: US military CRYPTO units for secure voice and data transmission, Mode IV (secure) IFF, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and secure anti-jam voice transmission system. Saudi AWACS also will not incorporate ECCM enhancements being developed for the US version. Commercially available US-made alternatives to the CRYPTO units and Mode IV IFF will be provided.

(U) The AWACS does not possess SIGINT, photo reconnaissance, or other intelligence gathering capabilities.

59. Q: Why are you announcing the proposed AWACS/F-15 enhancement package today, rather than at the time Congress reconvenes on September 9?

A: As you are aware, the 20-day informal notification period specified by law will begin when Congress reconvenes on September 9. At that time we will be engaged in a variety of other initiatives in the region, including consultations in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Begin on the Middle East peace process and our strategic objectives in the region. We felt that an announcement of the informal notification at that time would unduly complicate the President's talks with the Prime Minister. We have therefore decided to make the announcement now so as to make our position as clear as possible in advance of his arrival.